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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted since no privity of contract existed between Respondent and 
Appellants. 
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the 
court that 1) Defendant Balboa Insurance Company wrote and put up a payment 
bond covering the project; 2) That $4,431.45 worth of asphalt was used on 
Appellant Walker's job; 3) That Walker had knowledge that the amount of 
$4,431.45 was due Respondent; 4) A state statute existed which would allow 
Respondent to recover on Appellants' payment bond; and 5) That if a statute 
did exist granting a cause of action in favor of Respondent, Respondent 
complied with the content requirement of such statute. 
3. The court erred in awarding Respondent attorney's fees in 
conformity with Section 14-1-8 (1953 as amended) since said section was 
appealed by the Legislature in 1980. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff/Respondents Second 
Cause of Action which alleged that Appellants are liable to Respondent 
because Respondent furnished asphalt to a subcontractor of Appellant Walker 
who was a general contractor on a contract awarded by Ephraim City in 
Sanpete County and Appellant Balboa Insurance Company furnished a payment 
bond to Ephraim City. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Court without a jury wherein 
Respondent was awarded judgment against Appellants for the full amount of 
their claim plus attorney's fees in the amount of $1,200.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants have appealed the judgment rendered by the District 
Court and seek to have that judgment reversed on the grounds that the lower 
Court erred in granting judgment to Respondent in that the Court 
misconstrued the law in allowing Respondent to recover against Appellant 
Walker and its bonding agent Balboa Insurance Company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October, 1984, Appellant Walker Pipeline Construction (Walker) 
contracted with Neeley-Western (Neeley), a Utah corporation, to perform 
asphalt patching work for trenches dug in a waterline construction project 
in Ephraim, Utah, a project where Appellant Walker served as general 
contractor. (T.R. p. 62). During the month of October, 1982, there was an 
agreement between Respondent Cox Rock Products (Cox) and Neeley, the subcon-
tractor for Appellant Walker, for the sale of asphalt to the subcontractor 
Neeley. The asphalt was to be used by the subcontractor for the street 
resurfacing on Walker's job which was owned by Ephraim City Corporation. 
(T.R. p. 61). Neeley purchased the asphalt at Respondent's plant and hauled 
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the asphalt in one of two different trucks which were owned and operated by 
Neeley (T.R. p. 35). 
The work by Neeley was considered substandard and was rejected. 
The contractor, Appellant Walker, had to correct the substandard work 
performed by Neeley at its own expense and Neeley was not paid for the work 
which he performed. Neeley subsequently filed a petition in bankruptcy. 
(T.R. pp. 56; 85-88). Shortly after being informed that Neeleyfs work was 
rejected by the Inspector, Scott Walker, the agent for Appellant Walker 
contacted an agent of Respondent Cox on the 28th day of October, 1982, with 
regards to how much asphalt Respondent Cox actually furnished to Neeley on 
the Ephraim job. After reviewing many invoices for material charged by 
Neeley, Mr. Walker was provided with copies of six invoices totalling 
approximately 110 to 120 tons of asphalt which was delivered to the Ephraim 
job. (T.R. pp. 79; 80). At that time, the invoices only indicated the 
amount of asphalt which was received by Neeley, no price per ton or dollar 
amount having been included on the invoices. (T.R. p. 80). 
On December 28, 1982, Larry W. Cox, an agent for Respondent Cox 
sent a letter to Appellant Walker which letter was received into evidence as 
Exhibit No. 4. Respondent Cox maintained at trial that said letter 
constitutes sufficient notice under § 63-56-38 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as 
amended, which section gave rise to a cause of action in favor of Respondent 
Cox against both Appellants herein. 
A payment bond executed by Appellant Balboa Insurance Company was 
never introduced into evidence nor have Appellants admitted by pleadings 
that such has ever existed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SINCE THERE WAS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND APPELLANTS, 
RESPONDENT HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
APPELLANTS. 
Since there was no privity of contract between Respondent and 
Appellants, Respondent has no cause of action against Appellants unless 
there is a statute giving rise to such a cause of action against Appellants, 
The District Court relied upon two statutes in awarding judgment. 
The Utah Procurement Code, Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(a)(3), which does not 
apply to payment bonds when they are put up for the benefit of 
municipalities, and the second being that of Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-1 et. 
seq. which dealt with counties and municipalities, and was repealed by the 
Legislature in 1980. Laws 1980, Ch. 75 § 5. 
In 1983 the Legislature passed a bill providing for bonds to be 
furnished to the political entity awarding a public construction contract, 
to apply in cases where the entity is r ^t already covered by the Utah 
Procurement Code. Laws 1983, Ch. 61 [codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-1-13 
to 17 (Supp. 1983)]. As noted in Utah Legislative Survey, 1984 ULR 127, the 
new act was intended to correct the "exclusion of local political units from 
coverage by the Utah Procurement Code," Remarks by Senator Richard J. 
Carling on S.2., 45th Utah Legislative General Session (Jan. 18, 1983). 
Thus, the Legislature itself had recognized that local political 
units were excluded from the coverage of the Utah Procurement Code. The 
definitions and language in the Code make it clear that these units are not 
covered, that the Code was meant to apply only to political entities which 
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are regulated by the State and whose power comes straight from the State, 
rather than being gained locally. For example, the Board of Education, the 
Board of Health, and the Liquor Commission are covered by the Utah 
Procurement Code; cities and counties are not. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-5(18) defines a public procurement unit as 
being either a local public procurement unit or a state public procurement 
unit, which is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-5(27) as being the 
purchasing division of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-5(12) applies to 
political subdivisions and defines local public procurement unit as being: 
...any political subdivision or institution of higher 
education of the state or public agency of any 
subdivision, public authority, educational, health, or 
other institution, and to the extent provided by law, any 
other entity which expends public funds for the procure-
ment of supplies, services, and construction, but not 
counties, municipalities, political subdivisions created 
by counties or municipalities under the Interlocal Co-
operation Act, or the legislature and its staff offices. 
It includes two or more local public procurement units 
acting under legislation which authorizes 
intergovernmental cooperation...(emphasis added) 
It is clear that Ephraim City, being neither a state or local 
public procurement unit, is not covered by the Utah Procurement Code. 
Therefore, it was an error of law for the lower Court to allow Respondents 
to recover against the payment bond pursuant to this section, especially 
when the Court, in turn, allowed Respondent to recover attorney's fees under 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8, which was part of the law which applied to counties 
and municipalities, but was repealed in 1980. Laws 1980,Ch. 75 § 5. 
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POINT II. IN THE EVENT THE COURT FINDS THAT RESPONDENT 
DID HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH 
PROCUREMENT CODE, THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED 
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE CODE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(a)(3) provides that: 
Any person who has furnished labor or material to a 
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the 
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished 
under this section, who has not been paid in full within 
90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was supplied by the person for whom 
the cliam was made, shall have the right to sue on the 
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit 
is instituted and to prosecute an action for the amount 
due the person. However, any person having a contract 
with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or 
implied contract with the contractor furnishing the 
payment bond, shall have a right of action upon the 
payment bond by giving written notice to the contractor 
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person 
shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the name 
of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom 
the material was supplied. The notice shall be served 
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage 
pre-paid, in an envelope addressed to the contractor at 
any place the contractor maintains an office or conducts 
business. 
The issue presented here has not yet been presented to the Utah 
Supreme Court, as the statute has only recently been enacted. Respondent's 
motion for a new trial was granted based on the fact that a large amount of 
case law interpreting the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270 B, which contains 
similar language to the Utah Statute above had been found. 
In holding that Respondents had provided adequate notice to the 
Appellants, the lower Court based its decision on the recent Utah Supreme 
Court decision interpreting the Miller Act, Whiting Brothers Construction 
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mandatory. JLd_ at 879. The Court distinguished all of the cases which had 
dispelled with formalities in giving notice by noting that in each of those 
cases the contractor had been fully apprised by the plaintiff that the 
letter sent was meant to assert a direct claim in a specified amount. Id. 
^
e
 Thompson Court listed three basic requirements which must be 
in the content of the notice, in order to allow a claimant to dispense with 
the strict formalities of the manner in which notice is given. These are 
that the notice, 1) "must show it was intended to be the presentation of a 
claim11 against the contractor and surety, must state 2) "with substantial 
accuracy" the amount claimed to be owing to the materialman or laborer on 
the project; and 3) the name of the party to whom the material was 
furnished or for whom the labor was done. j[d_ at 876. Thus, the content 
requirement is to be strictly contrued. 
Similar decisions were reached in the cases of Bowden v. United 
States for Use of_ Malloy, 239 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1956); United States for 
Use and Benefit of Noland Co., Inc. v. Skinner ^ Ruddock, Inc., 164 F. Supp 
606 (E.D.S.C. 1958); United States for Use and Benefit of Henry Walke Co. v\_ 
William B^ VanDeRiet, 316 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1963); and United States for 
use of Charles R. Joyce _& Son, Inc. v. F. A. Baehner, Inc., 326 F.2d 556 
(2nd Cir. 1964). 
Despite the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Walker testified that they 
never received any phone calls or invoices showing the amount owed, or the 
December 28 letter allegedly sent by Mr. Cox, (T.R. pp. 81; 82; 95) the 
Court below found that Respondents had met the notice requirement of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-56-38(a)(3). The Court based this finding solely on the 
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an exact amount if he never had the exact figure until the date of the 
trial. 
Mr, Cox then testified that he sent the invoices to Mr. Walker 
(T.R. p. 24). However, he sent no explanatory letter with them, which was 
contrary to Respondents regular business practices (T.R. p. 39). Surely 
even the receipt of the invoices alone, would not constitute notice of the 
claim amount under the statute, especially when it is disputed that a dollar 
amount even appeared on the invoices when Mr. Walfcer obtained them from 
Respondent on October 28, 1982. (T.R. p. 82). 
Mr. Cox then testified that he sent a letter dated December 28, 
1982, to Mr. Walker (T.R. p. 40). This letter itself is purportedly the 
notice required by the statute. However, as such, it failed to state even 
an estimated total amount owing, a failure referred to by Mr. Cox as an 
oversight on his part (T.R. p. 40). Despite the fact that Mr. Cox, in the 
letter, referred to the invoices previously sent, such a reference cannot be 
construed to state the exact amount of the claim, especially where it is 
disputed that dollar amounts were written on the invoices. (T.R. p. 82). 
Such a holding by this Court would render the notice requirement useless if 
the Court were to allow for notice to be given in such a piecemeal fashion. 
It is clear that this letter did not meet the requirements for adequate 
notice in form or content under Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(a)(3). Thus, in 
the event the Procurement Code does apply to this transaction, which it 
clearly does not, the trial Court erred in allowing Respondent a cause of 
action under the Utah Procurement Code when the conditions precedent to 
bringing suit were not met. 
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B. Respondents invoices for Neeley's 
purchases of asphalt for Appellants project 
were kept combined withthose for Neeley's 
other projects and are therefore, unreliable 
and inaccurate. 
The evidence shows that in Respondents records, all of the 
transactions with Neeley were kept in the same file, and that there was no 
way to distinguish between purchases made for the Ephraim project and 
purchases made for other projects. (T.R. pp. 78; 79). 
On October 28, 1982, according to Mr. WaLker's testimony, Ron Cox 
could not tell him the amount that went into the Ephraim project, because 
all the transactions with Neeley were in one folder (Tr. 78). That same 
day, Mr. Walker observed this folder on Mr. Cox's desk and noted that it 
contained dozens of billings that had not yet been billed out and which only 
contained figures for the number of tons sold to Neeley. No dollar amounts 
were given. In this file, he noticed that all of the invoices for Neeleyfs 
other projects were intermingled with those for the Ephraim project. (T.R. 
p. 78). 
Larry Cox, also, testified that even he could not be sure that all 
of the material sold to Neeley was going into the Ephraim mproject (T.R. p. 
37). In fact, he indicated that even the accounting system used by 
Respondents made no distinction between Neeley1s different transactions. 
(T.R. p. 42). He testified that when he quoted an amount to Mr. Walker in 
November (T.R. p. 23) and December (T.R. p. 19) and to Mrs. Walker (T.R. p. 
23), that he probably had his secretary separate out the invoices pertaining 
to the Ephraim project. (T.R. p. 42). However, he said that he himself had 
never totalled them until that day during the trial. (T.R. p. 42). 
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ignored this evidence and chose to believe Mr. Neeley, who was not on the 
job at the time, and who had no recollection or records as did Mr. Walker. 
To hold Mr. Walker responsible for this quantity, of which was not used on 
his project, is against the weight of the evidence and manifestly unjust. 
D. The award to respondents is based on 
respondents loading tickets, the statements 
on which may have been altered and are 
inconsistent with testimony. 
The invoices used to determine Appellants1 liability in this case 
were taken in part from tickets given to Neeley by Respondents each time 
Neeley made a purchase of materials from Respondent. No material was 
delivered to the job site by Respondent. (T.R. pp. 34-36). 
Neeley admitted to writing the number 131 on one of the invoices, 
indicating that that was the number he had assigned to the Ephraim Project 
(T.R. p. 47), and no numbers were found on the other tickets for the Ephraim 
project or otherwise (T.R. p. 35), yet all of the tonnage amounts on the 
tickets were ultimately charged to the Ephraim job. Interestingly, this 
same ticket marked 131 for the Ephraim project was for the delivery of road 
base (T.R. p. 34), which was never supplied to the Ephraim project by 
Neeley, as Mr. Walker recalled that it had been supplied by the Central Utah 
Coal Company (T.R. p. 69). Also, Mr. Neeley, who had signed the ticket, did 
not think that road base had been used on the Ephraim project (T.R. p. 58). 
On another ticket numbered 17126, someone had crossed out Moroni and written 
in Ephraim trenches (T.R. p. 36). This is also very interesting in that 
Neeley had had another project going on in Moroni (T.R. p. 54) upon which it 
was noticed, that the road base was being used (T.R. p. 63). The other 
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The Court awarded attorney's fees to Respondent, relying on Utah 
Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (T.R. p. 115). It was error for the Court to do so 
because there was no statutory authority for doing so when the transactions 
occurred or when the Complaint was filed. The Material was supplied by 
Respondent in October, 1982, and this suit was filed in May of 1983. Utah 
Code Ann. § 14-1-8 was repealed by the Legislature in 1980 and § 14-1-16 
relied upon by Respondent at trial was not enacted by the Legislature until 
the 1983 session and did not take effect until July of 1983. Laws 1983, Ch. 
61 § 3. 
To allow Respondents to recover under this provision is contrary 
to Utah law. First of all, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 prohibits the 
retroactive application of laws unless the law itself expressly provides for 
retroactive application. There have been several, narrowly drawn judicial 
exceptions to this rule. 
The first is when the new statute is enacted, "to clarify the 
meaning of an earlier enactment.11 State Department of Social Services v. 
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). A statutory seciton pertaining to 
attorney's fees surely does not fit inot this exception. 
A law which is procedural may be applied retroactively when it is 
enacted after the suit has been begun only when it, "would not enlarge, 
eliminate or destroy vested or contractural rights". JLd^  at 1000. Generally 
retrospective application is not favored, especially when retrospective 
enforcement would modify vested interests. Pilcher v. State Department of 
Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
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at trial does not apply to a municipality and similar sections of the Utah 
Code relating to municipalites were not in effect at the time Respondent 
supplied material to Neeley, nor was it in effect at the time Respondent 
filed its Complaint. 
Not only did the Court err in finding that Respondent had a cause 
of action on the alleged bond of Appellant Balboa under the Utah Procurement 
Code, the Court also erred in finding that Respondent substantially complied 
with the notice requirement as set forth in the Utah Procurement Code. The 
Court seems to have relied upon the Procurement Code in finding that 
Respondent had a cause of action against Appellants but, allowed Respondent 
attorney's fees in its action by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8. The 
Court clearly erred in the awarding of attorney's fees since the statute on 
which the Court relied in awarding attorney's fees was repealed by the 
Legislature in 1980. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of December, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD E. KUNZ Q 
Attorney for Appellants 
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